Iranian Wedding Rice: II

Below,  the translation from the prior post - which has made an appearance on three separate platforms now:

Today, more than ever, the US and Israel are discussing a ground attack on Iran. This is after the failure of various US plans to pressure Iran with air strikes and create chaos inside, so they have resorted to a ground attack plan to force Iran to accept a ceasefire.

This requires a massive military buildup of forces at the IRGC level.

Given the increased US military movements to begin the ground attack process, we can assume that they have created this corridor. We need to see where the US forces are moving in this corridor.

If the US has succeeded in creating a secure and stable supply corridor along the Saudi Arabia-Jordan axis and deploys an armored unit at the IRGC level with full support capacity along it, then the most logical operational path for advancing would be to move towards Basra and then try to enter Khuzestan and Ahvaz. This axis is geographically the shortest route to reach Iran's energy heartland and can also serve as a connecting point between operations in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.

In this context, the issue of capturing Kharg Island, which is raised by the Western media, has become a symbolic and media goal rather than a primary operational goal.

The actual capture of Kharg without reaching the coast and establishing land lines on land is practically impossible, because any operation against this island requires continuous cover, coastal protection, and sustainable logistical support.

However, the United States and Israel, due to its psychological and economic importance, are trying to highlight Kharg as the main goal, while in reality, this goal is of secondary operational importance.

Of course, the discussion of a possible attack on the Bushehr nuclear power plant to create an initial shock and psychological collapse of the people is also likely to see the use of heliborne forces in Bushehr or parts of Hormozgan province to capture the coast to secure the occupation of the islands desired by the Americans before the ground forces arrive.

Let's return to the plan for a large-scale ground war.

I would like to remind you that the arrival of airborne forces such as the 82nd and 101st divisions in the region, if an adequate logistical infrastructure is not established, means that their scope of operations will be limited to isolated areas and then they will be severely defeated.

For this reason, such forces can most often land on islands, remote coasts or mountainous areas in these conditions.

For this reason, areas such as the Hormuz Islands or mountainous areas along the Pakistani border are more operationally logical for such forces than a deep advance into Iranian territory without heavy support.

At the same time, there are signs of armored reinforcements from the 1st Armored Division, which was previously predictable. But what is more important is the composition of the forces that are being formed: the 3rd Infantry Division, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, the 5th Special Forces Group, the Green Berets and the 1st Armored Division. This composition is exactly the same as the one used in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In that operation, some of the forces were transported deep by helicopter, while armored and infantry units opened a supply route from the land axis of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Airborne forces landed in the Baghdad-Karbala-Najaf triangle and, by seizing key points, paved the way to Baghdad.

The 5th Special Forces Group was responsible for missions such as assassination, capture, directing aerial fire, and countering irregular forces, and the 3rd Infantry Division played a general support role.

Meanwhile, the Green Helmets were pursuing more sensitive missions such as leading attacks on Baghdad airport and breaking organized resistance.

The goal of this plan was to quickly penetrate Baghdad before the ground forces fully arrived from the south, collapsing the command structure and breaking the enemy's resistance in a short time.

However, in practice, American forces encountered scattered resistance and the risk of encirclement at times, and were only able to control the situation through the collapse of Iraq's internal structure and absolute air superiority.

In the current situation, the United States is trying to reproduce a similar pattern, with the difference that this time the goal is to simultaneously create a threat to Basra and Baghdad and to drag Iraq into renewed instability so that it can use this chaos as a platform to pressure Iran.

The Americans know that in normal times, any movement to transfer forces to Iraqi soil would mean the direct entry of the Popular Mobilization Forces into the conflict, and to prevent this, there is a need to create chaos in Iraq and the presence of army forces close to the US to create a barrier between the passage of American forces to enter Iran and the Popular Mobilization Forces.

At the beginning of the war, the scenario of entering from northern Iraq using PKK forces was also raised, but the main focus shifted to the Jordanian-Saudi axis; where special forces tried to penetrate the desert, consolidate points and create an advance route, but were forced to retreat in the face of existing resistance.

The official statements of the Revolutionary Guards that they were targeting American assembly and advance points in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq indicate that efforts to create this logistics corridor were indeed underway.

This confirms that the main battle is not taking place on the classic front lines, but deep in the deserts and along logistical routes.

At the macro level, the network of CENTCOM bases, although damaged, is still active in support of ground operations. The transfer of helicopter units to places such as Djibouti, Cyprus, Somaliland, Puntland, and Crete indicates an attempt to create a flexible support network. In addition, large weapons depots in Greece and increased armored transportation in the United States indicate that an extensive supply chain for a long war is taking shape.

In addition, the United States continues to analyze Iran from a land perspective on the model of Iraq and is trying to repeat the same combination of forces and the same method of rapid penetration. This is while Iraq’s biggest mistake was to enter into a classic direct confrontation, which led to its rapid defeat in 1991 and 2003. In contrast, Iran, with its layered, asymmetric, and mosaic defense structure, has created a completely different situation.

If the US cannot carry out a large-scale and coordinated ground operation, it will likely move towards increasing internal chaos, focusing on Iraq and attempting limited operations on islands and coasts.Meanwhile, the use of proxy forces, NATO elements, forces transferred from Ukraine and mercenaries, along with FPV drones and suicide operations, indicates a move towards a hybrid war.

In the maritime domain, the US Navy is seeking to establish a presence east of Bandar Abbas and the Jask and Chabahar regions, seeing these areas as suitable locations for establishing remote primary bases.

At the same time, efforts to expand the operational networks of separatist terrorists in Pakistan and the use of former anti-Iran forces in Afghanistan before the Taliban and even the use of foreign militia structures and mercenaries indicate a plan to create instability on Iran’s eastern fringes.

However, all of these areas – whether the Persian Gulf islands, the Iraqi axis, or the Makran coast – are known militarily as “death traps,” as any deployment there would be exposed to constant coastal, missile, and asymmetric fire.

There are also signs of a change in American behavior in the air domain.

After suffering heavy losses in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, the US Air Force has taken a greater distance while at the same time trying to maintain close air support with low-altitude attacks.

This indicates adaptation to an active and dangerous defensive environment, meaning that not only has Iran’s defense not been destroyed, but it has also adapted day by day to the enemy’s air dominance war conditions and has become a deadly threat today, especially after the F-35s were targeted. The media empire of complete American air superiority has collapsed.

In the event of a possible ground attack and then as the fighters enter the close air support phase of the forces, the hunt for American fighters will rapidly intensify.

Ultimately, what is emerging is a complex, multi-layered scenario in which the United States attempts to create the conditions for a decisive battle by combining airstrikes, limited ground operations, hybrid warfare, and regional chaos.

However, the organizational status of these forces has not yet been fully established, and political decisions at the highest levels, particularly among American and Israeli leaders, will play a decisive role in the final shape of the operation.

What seems certain is that any attempt to enter Iran by land, unlike Iraq, will encounter a highly erosive environment, complex geography, and a multi-layered defense structure; an environment that not only makes rapid advancement impossible, but can also turn the entire operation into a long and costly war whose outcome is unpredictable.

But before I end, I would like to remind you that all these operations were formed on the basis that at a stage of external pressure, a part of the Iranian people, in coordination with Mossad and CIA cells, took to the streets and tried to create unrest and insecurity so that operational intelligence teams could be quickly activated for internal operations such as attacks on missile cities or barracks.

This is where the role of the people in their night presence on the streets becomes extremely important, and I believe that in some cases this role becomes even more prominent and important than that of the Iranian military.

Without popular support, military attacks remain elusive.

Today, a situation has arisen in Iran that perhaps in the next hundred years, such conditions will not be found for every Iranian citizen to play a role in determining the fate of the country of Iran, and anyone who underestimates or misses this opportunity to be present and play a role will greatly regret it in the future. On the contrary, those who are present with their families these nights, after the end of the war and recording the importance of this presence in history, will talk to their children and grandchildren in the coming years about this great epic as one of the prerequisites for the formation of the great Iranian empire.

History is the best narrator